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Existing research on war and peace lacks analysis of what allows peace-
building to succeed at the subnational level. Instead, most scholars focus
on peacebuilding failure and macro-level dynamics. This is unfortunate
because the obstacles to peacebuilding are such that the most puzzling
question is why international efforts sometimes succeed, rather than why
they fail. The lack of focus on success is also problematic because it re-
sults in ambiguous findings. On the one hand, there is an emerging con-
sensus that local conflict resolution is crucial to building peace. There is
also an agreement that, all else being equal, international support tends
to increase the chances of successful peacebuilding. On the other hand,
when international actors have tried to back local initiatives, they have
often generated counterproductive consequences and worsened the situ-
ation. Should international actors support local peacebuilding processes?
If so, how can they actually do this?
Drawing on in-depth interviews, field and participant observations in
nine different conflict zones, and document analysis, this article takes
the first step in explaining whether, how, why, and under what condi-
tions international interveners (including donors, diplomats, peace-
keepers, and the foreign staff of international and non-governmental
organizations) can contribute to successful local and bottom-up peace ef-
forts. It makes three central contributions. First, it shows that the policy
and scholarly literatures suffer from a dearth of findings on successful
international support to local conflict resolution. Second, it emphasizes
the critical—and under-researched—role of assumptions in shaping
peacebuilding initiatives. Third, it develops a theoretical framework to
analyze how assumptions influence international peace efforts. By way of
illustration, the article analyzes three widespread assumptions about
peacebuilding and the role of peacebuilders. In each case, it challenges
assumptions that international interveners take for granted but that are
actually unfounded and detrimental, while identifying assumptions that
promote peacebuilding effectiveness.
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Introduction
Peacebuilding is a crucial task. More than forty countries around the world are
currently in the midst of a war or going through post-conflict reconstruction. This
instability heightens the risks of mass atrocities and genocide. It undermines legi-
timate governments, the rule of law, and universal standards of human dignity. It
creates a fertile breeding ground for terrorists and illicit traffickers, providing
them with safe havens and funding. It makes states less able to respond to conta-
gious diseases, resulting in widespread pandemics like the recent Ebola crisis. It
generates massive refugee flows. Moreover, at times, internal disorder and vio-
lence can lead the United States, its allies, China, and Russia to intervene milita-
rily or politically, resulting in potentially destabilizing geopolitical battles, as is
currently happening in Syria.
Because the consequences of persistent violence are so severe, international
peace interventions have multiplied since the end of the Cold War. United
Nations operations (Daniel 2008, 11; Duffey 2000, 142), non-governmental agen-
cies (Barnett 2011, 3–5; Werker and Ahmed 2008, 75), donors (Barnett 2011, 4),
diplomatic missions, and regional organizations have become increasingly nume-
rous and influential (Anderson and Olson 2003, 8). For instance, more than
100,000 troops, observers, and police personnel currently serve as United Nations
peacekeepers in sixteen operations across four continents (United Nations 2016).
This represents the second-largest deployed force abroad after the US military.
Peacebuilding actors accomplish a very wide variety of tasks. The most wide-
spread—and most skeletal—definition of peacebuilding refers to actions aimed at
creating, strengthening, and solidifying peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992). At a mini-
mum, it involves reestablishing a measure of security. Tasks therefore include
peacemaking—the process of bringing parties in conflict to an agreement
through peaceful means—and peacekeeping (United Nations Security Council
2016), which denotes the “deployment of international personnel to help main-
tain peace and security” after a war (Fortna 2008, 5). Most scholars and policy-
makers consider several other elements beyond this security dimension. A broad
consensus has emerged on the need for socio-economic recovery, which in turn
calls for humanitarian and development aid (Collier et al. 2003; United Nations
Security Council 2001, para. 18–20). A fierce debate also exists over what types of
political institutions and processes are necessary, but most thinkers include state-
building, justice, and reconciliation, and numerous authors also add democracy
(Call 2008, 183–86; United Nations Security Council 2001, para. 10–20). In sum,
to use Galtung’s (1969) well-known distinction, peacebuilding initiatives aim to
create not only “negative peace”—the absence of war and violence—but also
“positive peace”—the conditions that make peace sustainable over the long
term—both in interstate wars and in civil conflicts.
These peace efforts have achieved many crucial results. They have helped host
nation authorities and populations end widespread violence, reestablish security,
promote economic development, and organize democratic elections in
Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, among many
other places.
Admittedly, although foreign actors routinely contribute to conflict resolution,
peacebuilding efficacy relies primarily on the actions, interests, and strategies of
domestic entities. Wars can end only when hostile parties at the local, national,
and regional levels agree to stop using violence to resolve their differences, and
when their fellow citizens concurrently strive to establish and maintain lasting
solutions to the conflict. Foreign interveners—including donors, diplomats,
peacekeepers, and the foreign staff of international and non-governmental orga-
nizations—can, at best, support peace initiatives and undermine efforts to resume
violence.
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That being said, external contributions do increase the chances of establishing
a durable peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti
2008; Goldstein 2011; Howard 2008; Walter 2002).1 Unfortunately, many inter-
national peacebuilding efforts never manage actually to promote peace: the rate
of failure varies by source from 15 percent (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008) to 75 per-
cent (Weinstein 2005, 11 and 33).2
Regrettably, the policy and academic communities lack analytical insights into
how to enhance peacebuilding success. Indeed, both research and practice in
international peacebuilding have yielded ambiguous findings. On the one hand,
there is the above-mentioned agreement that, all else being equal, international
support tends to increase the chances of successful peacebuilding. There is also
an emerging consensus that local and bottom-up conflict resolution are crucial to
controlling violence and promoting reconciliation in many war and postwar envi-
ronments.3 (In this article, “local” means at the level of the individual, the family,
the clan, the district, the province, and the ethnic group when it is not a national-
level one.4) On the other hand, many instances in which international actors tried
to support local initiatives have generated counterproductive consequences. For
instance, they have undermined domestic efforts to promote human rights in
Malawi (Englund 2006) and resolve grassroots conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo—henceforth Congo—and Tajikistan (Gallo and Vanholder
2015; Heathershaw 2009); at times they have even fueled violence, as in
Afghanistan (Martin 2014), Congo (Autesserre 2014b), and Uganda (Branch
2011). Combining these conflicting insights raises two central research questions:
Should international actors support local peacebuilding processes? If so, how can
they actually do this?
To answer these questions, my broad project investigates whether, how, why,
and under what conditions international interveners can contribute to successful
local and bottom-up peace efforts. To do so, it builds on, refines, and expands my
earlier research on international peacebuilding (see notably Autesserre 2010 and
2014b). This article presents the first findings from this new project. It makes
three central contributions, which constitute the first three sections of this paper.
First, it demonstrates that the policy and scholarly literatures suffer from a dearth
of findings on successful international support to local peace efforts. Second, it
emphasizes the crucial—and under-researched—role of assumptions in shaping
peacebuilding initiatives. Third, it develops a theoretical framework to analyze
how assumptions influence the effectiveness of international peace efforts. By way
of illustration, the last part analyzes three widespread assumptions about peace-
building and the role of peacebuilders. In each case, it challenges assumptions
that international interveners take for granted but that are actually unfounded
and detrimental, and it identifies assumptions that promote peacebuilding
effectiveness. In the conclusion, I highlight the policy and scholarly implications
of my analysis, and I emphasize the need for further research to answer fully the
two questions at the heart of my broader project.
1For a dissenting view, see Lund (2003). For a discussion of this debate, see Paris (2011, 351–53) and Autesserre
(2014b, 21–23).
2For other estimates (all of which use different definitions of “success” and “failure”), see Call (2008, 173–83);
Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 74–75); Fortna (2008, 104–16 and 125). For a discussion of these widely divergent esti-
mates, see Autesserre (2014b, 21–23) and Paris (2011, 351–53).
3Among many others: Anderson and Wallace (2013); Autesserre (2010); Hughes, €Ojendal, and Schierenbeck
(2015); Lederach (1997); Leonardsson and Rudd (2015); McGuinness (2012); Mitchell and Hancock (2012);
Odendaal (2013); Zelizer and Rubinstein (2009).
4“Local peacebuilding projects” thus refers to subnational projects, and “local stakeholders” to the population
from the area targeted by a given peacebuilding initiative. These people do not form a homogeneous community:
They usually comprise many political, economic, social, and religious subgroups and hold very varied (and at times
conflicting) interests and traditions.
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This article relies on rich ethnographic material in addition to numerous
secondary sources. My ethnographic material includes 718 in-depth interviews,
three and a half years of field observations, and participant observations of hun-
dreds of peacebuilding events and projects. I collected this data primarily in
Congo (where I traveled regularly between 2001 and 2016). I also draw on re-
search visits to Afghanistan (in 2002), Burundi (where I went several times be-
tween 2003 and 2012), Cyprus (in 2011), Israel and the Palestinian Territories (in
2012), Kosovo (in 2000), Nicaragua (in 1998), South Sudan (in 2011), and
Timor-Leste (in 2012 and 2016). In addition, I build on participant observations
and interviews conducted in the New York headquarters of various international
and non-governmental organizations as well as interviews in African, European,
North American, and Oceanic capitals (between 1999 and 2016). The article is
also informed by a thorough analysis of primary source documents from
international programs, an extensive review of available policy and scholarly stud-
ies of peacebuilding (during which I paid particular attention to impact studies
and randomized control trials), and a systematic review of ninety-seven evalu-
ations of international projects in support of local peace initiatives.5
Unlike most existing literature, my analysis does not seek to account for inter-
vention successes or failures at the aggregate (national or international) level.
Instead, it considers the relative effectiveness of individual peacebuilding projects
and programs and the common factors that contribute to their success. To that
end, I use a situation-specific definition of effectiveness that reflects the contested
understandings of peace, success, and failure (on these, see Autesserre 2014b, 21–
24; CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2011, 3). I consider a peacebuilding pro-
ject, program, or intervention to be effective when a large majority of imple-
menters (international and local peacebuilders) and intended beneficiaries
(including local elite and ordinary citizens) perceive it as having promoted peace
in the area of intervention. My definition does not require that a program or pro-
ject garner universal praise—some individuals or groups will always be dissatisfied.
Nor does it demand that the initiative’s contributions to the establishment of
peace take one specific form over another. Some efforts can directly reduce or
prevent violence. Others can do so indirectly by creating the broader conditions
that facilitate peace, for instance by strengthening institutions that address con-
flict. My definition simply reflects a general consensus among the people involved
in and affected by a given initiative that it has advanced, in one way or another,
the establishment of peace.
Successful International Support to Local Peacebuilding:
An Under-Researched Topic
The scholarly and policy literature on peacebuilding was virtually nonexistent in
the early 1990s, but it has grown considerably since then (Pugh 2013, 11). Thanks
to this recent research, we now have strong evidence as to the causes of violence
and peacebuilding failure. However, we know much less about what allows peace-
building to succeed. Indeed, just like studies of peace actually often focus on vio-
lence (Diehl 2016), studies of peacebuilding—including my previous work (e.g.,
Autesserre 2010 and 2014b) —overwhelmingly focus on problematic cases, ignor-
ing successful experiences (Autesserre 2014a; Fortna 2008, 2–4; Fortna and
Howard 2008; Howard 2008, 2–3). This is unfortunate because, as Fortna (2008)
and Howard (2008) note, the obstacles to peacekeeping and peacebuilding are
such that the most puzzling question is why international efforts sometimes suc-
ceed, rather than why they fail. In addition, this focus leads most analysts to be-
lieve that the reasons for peace and peacebuilding success are the inverse of the
5The review methodology and a list of included evaluations are available upon request.
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reasons for war and peacebuilding failures. However, just as this assumption is
questionable for peace (Diehl 2016), it is questionable for peacebuilding. For in-
stance, many authors have demonstrated that lack of financial resources is a main
cause of peacekeeping failure (e.g., Downs and Stedman 2002; Doyle and
Sambanis 2006), but an abundance of resources can be equally problematic
(Gallo and Vanholder 2015; Manning and Zu¨rcher 2013, 34; Moore 2013, 5–6).
Of the inquiries that do look at peacebuilding success (usually just a part of
larger studies), the majority focus on macro-level dynamics, such as national and
international peace processes (e.g., Call and Wyeth 2008; Walter 2002), economic
conditions (e.g., Paris 2004), and the specific characteristics of the international
interveners, like their mandate (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Van der Lijn
2009), vested interests (e.g., Adebajo 2011; Stedman 1997; Zartman 1989), and re-
sources (e.g., Fortna 2008; Hampson 1996). These authors, along with most po-
licymakers, assume that peace achieved on the national and international stages
will automatically trickle down to the local spheres.6 Consequently, international
peacebuilding interventions usually proceed in a top-down fashion, focusing on
assuaging national and international sources of conflict (Autesserre 2010, 41–83;
Richmond 2005, 149–80).
Yet, local and subnational conflicts often motivate large parts of civil war vio-
lence, whether in Afghanistan (Dennys and Zaman 2009), Congo (Autesserre
2010), Timor-Leste (Scambary 2014), or many other past and present conflicts
(Justino, Bru¨ck, and Verwimp 2013; Kalyvas 2006). Consequently, peacebuilding
success at the macro level does not necessarily constitute peace at the subnational
level (Lund 2003; Mac Ginty 2006).7 As a result, in the past fifteen years, scholars
have started studying the local and micro-level dimensions of peacebuilding (see
Autesserre 2014a for a review of this literature), and policymakers and practi-
tioners have started paying attention to local conflict resolution.
Among the authors who work on subnational peacebuilding, the consensus is
that only a combination of top-down and bottom-up efforts can build a sustain-
able peace (e.g., Autesserre 2010; Lederach 1997; McGuinness 2012; Zelizer and
Rubinstein 2009). Recent research has shown that international interventions,
notably the presence of peacekeeping troops, are critical to enabling the success
of top-down processes (Beardsley 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008;
Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Goldstein 2011; Hampson 1996; Howard 2008;
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Walter 2002). However, this finding may
not apply to peacebuilding at the micro level. In fact, the only bottom-up effort
truly successful on a significant scale, Somaliland, is noteworthy precisely for the
lack of international involvement (Bradbury 2008, 245–46; Cairns 2006; Eubank
2010; Lewis 2008, ix–x and 95; Menkhaus 1996; Renders 2012, 3).
Worse, research on the local impacts of international efforts has yielded dis-
heartening findings. Costalli (2014) argues that, despite some positive outcomes,
peacekeeping deployment does not reduce subsequent violence at the municipal
level. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010) demonstrate that peacekeepers neither pro-
mote local security nor help restore local authority. Likewise, both community-
driven reconstruction projects and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion programs regularly fail to reach many of their intended goals (Gilligan,
Mvukiyehe, and Samii 2012; Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra, and Van der Windt
2012; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007). Some foreign peace efforts have even
increased the number and severity of human rights violations in Uganda (Branch
2011), hampered democracy in Malawi and Tajikistan (Englund 2006;
Heathershaw 2009), amplified gender disparities and sexual abuse in Bosnia,
6For critical discussions of these assumptions, see Autesserre (2010), 41–83; and Manning (2003).
7For specific examples on Cambodia, see Peou (2012); on Congo: Autesserre (2010); on Nepal: Denskus
(2009), 54; on Tajikistan: Heathershaw (2009).
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Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Simm 2013), disrupted local economies in
Congo, Liberia, and South Sudan (Bøa˚s and Jennings in progress), and fueled
violence in Congo and Afghanistan (Autesserre 2012; Martin 2014).
There is some research on successful international support to local or bottom-
up peacebuilding processes. Unfortunately, most of those existing studies focus
on one program, initiative, organization, or sector instead of adopting a broader
view of the situation (for instance, Ford 2006; Sambunjaka and Simunovich 2007;
Shank and Schirch 2008). This approach overlooks the interplay between various
peacebuilding efforts and limits the generalizability of any theoretical findings.
Moreover, these studies are often written either as reports by the donor or imple-
menting organization, who try to paint themselves in the best possible light (e.g.,
McGuinness 2012; Pinnington 2014), or as contracted outside evaluations, which
also include biases such as self-censorship, data manipulation, and non-
publication of critical findings (author’s interviews, 2010–2016; Church and
Rogers 2006, 195). Finally, the handful of scholarly studies on successful inter-
national peace efforts at the local level have all produced very different findings
(Autesserre 2014b; Cairns 2006; Campbell 2017; Holohan 2005; Moore 2013;
Zanotti 2010; Zelizer and Rubinstein 2009). This wide variation in findings is also
present in the ninety-seven evaluations of recent international peacebuilding pro-
jects that I reviewed for this article. This leaves us with no clear understanding of
the mechanisms through which foreign interveners can best contribute to grass-
roots conflict resolution and which international actors or actions are particularly
helpful on the ground.
In sum, existing research lacks analysis of what allows peacebuilding to succeed
at the subnational level. As a result, as the next section details, many policymakers
and practitioners rely on unsupported assumptions rather than on empirical evi-
dence to formulate and implement their programs.
Understanding the Role of Assumptions in Peacebuilding
The Critical Role of Assumptions
Studies of what policymakers and practitioners call “theories of change” under-
score the crucial role of assumptions in current peacebuilding efforts. Theories of
change are not “theories” in the academic understanding of the term; instead,
they are “explanations of how and why a set of activities”—for instance, a disarma-
ment project—will achieve desired objectives, such as a more peaceful society
(Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson 2007, 25). One might expect all peacebuild-
ing initiatives to be grounded in theories of change that enunciate a clear causal
chain and are substantiated by evidence. However, most peace projects instead
rely on unsupported assumptions.
Explicit theories of change are absent from many peacebuilding program docu-
ments and, “in many cases, theories of change or logical frameworks are not a key
part, or a part at all, of the programme-planning process” (Brown et al. 2015, 9,
see also 5, 14, and 31). Rather, these programs rest upon implicit—and implicitly
shared—theories of change, which are rooted in the project designers’ cumulative
experience.
The problem with both stated and unstated theories of change is that they are
often unrealistic or overly simplistic (Brown et al. 2015; Cameron et al. 2015).
Examples abound, such as non-governmental organizations telling their donors
that a year-long project will produce democracy (author’s interview, 2016) or pro-
gram documents explaining that “democracy brings stability and elects leaders
who can ensure peace” (Cameron et al. 2015, 5). In addition, these theories often
include massive leaps in logic (Brown et al. 2015, 9, 11, and 14). A case in point is
the expected peacebuilding impact of livelihood programs for victims of sexual
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violence. They rely on a tenuous causal chain, arguing that providing rape victims
with sewing machines (or chickens, or the means to set up a beauty salon) will
help these women gain financial independence, which will in turn give them
greater political voice, and will thus help end sexual violence (as analyzed in
Gowrinathan and Cronin-Furman 2015, section 3).
Most peacebuilders also assume that their initiatives will influence war and peace
outcomes, but they often do not have evidence to support this belief. Indeed, in its
review of all available impact evaluations of peacebuilding initiatives, the Evidence
for Peace project found that evaluations often measure “individual outcomes,” or “so-
cietal and institutional outcomes,” but that “there is a dearth of studies that attempt
to measure outcomes further along a peacebuilding causal chain—that is, actual
peace and violence outcomes,” such as displacement and repatriation, intergroup
conflict, interpersonal conflict and violence, crime and gang violence, and percep-
tions of safety and security (Cameron et al. 2015, 55).
All in all, assumptions play a central role in the design of most peacebuilding
efforts. It is therefore crucial to examine the assumptions on which policymakers
base their support to local programs. Surprisingly, despite their importance, as-
sumptions have been the focus of only one scholarly article on peacebuilding,
whose goal is very different from that of my analysis (Jantzi and Jantzi 2009). As a
result, we have no theoretical framework to analyze how assumptions influence
peacebuilding effectiveness. Building on the extensive literature on related con-
cepts, the rest of this section develops a framework to fill this gap.
The Origin, Diffusion, and Persistence of Assumptions
While peacebuilders’ initiatives can be context specific, their shared assumptions
often transcend national and regional boundaries. Indeed, as I have demonstrated in
a previous book (Autesserre 2014b), interveners from various geographic, religious,
professional, and organizational backgrounds—including civilian, military, and police
staff members—form a transnational group. Although there are many differences be-
tween the various members of this group, there are also numerous similarities. In
particular, most foreign peacebuilders share common practices, habits, and narratives
when they are deployed on the ground (Autesserre 2014b). These shared ways of
working and thinking are “‘free-floating,’ transportable, mobile, and transient,” and
thus can be readily “transplanted in any” conflict and post-conflict context (Verma
2011, 59). Assumptions are a central part of this culture.
Tracing the origin of each assumption I identify is an essential part of my
broader project, but it falls beyond the scope of this article. The findings of or-
ganizational theorists (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Weick 1995), sociologists
(Berger and Luckmann 1967), and political scientists (Barnett and Finnemore
2004; Finnemore 1996; Krebs 2015; Paris 2003), however, provide two useful start-
ing points. First, assumptions are socially constructed over long periods of time.
Second, one can locate their sources on the global stage (for instance, the idea
that outsiders have what local populations lack), in the peacebuilding field (the
view that good things always go together and that peacebuilding efforts are always
necessary), or in practice8 (the funding of education to promote peace) com-
bined with the belief that lessons from one place can be transferred to another
(Autesserre 2014b, 90–93; Stewart and Knaus 2012, 101).
In addition, the literature on frames, habits, and narratives is useful to under-
stand why some assumptions become dominant (Bakke 2014; Hopf 2010; Keck
and Sikkink 1998; Lanz 2011). Certain ideas resonate more and are more effective
at influencing action because they latch on to preexisting assumptions (for in-
stance, the idea that democracy promotes peacebuilding latching on to the belief
8Practice is the very experience of doing peacebuilding on the ground.
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that all good things go together), identify a short and clear causal chain, and sug-
gest a simple solution. As was evident from my fieldwork, these last two features
are particularly important in enabling an assumption to achieve and maintain
prominence even when it generates negative impacts. Peacebuilders face two con-
ditions that make shortcuts like assumptions or habits indispensable: situations of
“cognitive overload”—having to think about more than one task at once—and
circumstances with “severe time constraints,” in which people lack the time neces-
sary for conscious deliberation (Hopf 2010, 542–43 and 547). International inter-
veners have so many priorities to address in so little time that they do not have
much opportunity to question their usual views on peacebuilding and their role
as peacebuilders. Moreover, the lack of in-depth knowledge of local situations fur-
ther incentivizes them to rely on shortcuts, like assumptions, to interpret and re-
spond to their environments (Autesserre 2014b, 68–96).
When donors adopt a given assumption, this also boosts the likelihood that this
assumption will achieve preeminence. Indeed, foreign ministries, aid depart-
ments, foundations, and United Nations agencies often use their control over
financial resources to orient the programs of peacebuilding implementers (non-
governmental organizations, civil-society associations, and local or national
authorities). This authority structure creates incentives for on-the-ground peace-
builders to adopt—or, at least, claim to adopt—assumptions in which they may
not have originally believed or with which they may actually disagree.
Once assumptions become dominant, a series of formal and informal mecha-
nisms help spread and reproduce them (Autesserre 2014b, 38–39). Graduate pro-
grams (in international affairs, aid, or conflict studies) and internal trainings
draw from a common set of ideas and encourage a common mindset, which par-
ticipants then bring to various organizations or theaters of deployment. In ad-
dition, international peacebuilders change agencies and countries regularly over
the course of their careers, usually carrying over the assumptions acquired from
their previous postings to their new positions (Autesserre 2014b, 81–84). In the
field, numerous coordination meetings among interveners, as well as frequent in-
formal interactions at parties, bars, and restaurants, provide forums to exchange
information, reiterate the prevailing assumptions, and socialize newcomers in the
dominant thinking (Autesserre 2014b, 38–39 and 159–69). As with the adoption
of habits (Hopf 2010, 542), novices adopt dominant assumptions because of cost-
benefit calculations, imitation of surrounding peacebuilders, or socialization to
the norms of their new environment.
Unfortunately, even when some individuals are initially skeptical, the lack of
local knowledge, the focus on short-term and quantifiable results, and the fact
that peacebuilders are not accountable to their beneficiaries (Autesserre 2014b,
68–96, 209–13, and 239–45) often prevent interveners from realizing just how
detrimental some of their dominant assumptions are and how important it is to
dispute them. Confirmation biases and motivated reasoning—the psychological
processes that enable people to reach conclusions in line with preexisting beliefs
and interests despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Janis and Mann
1977; Kunda 1990; Levy and Thompson 2010, 141–50; Lord, Ross, and Lepper
1979)—help further entrench existing assumptions. To make matters worse, as
the last section of this article explains, the power dynamics between international
and local peacebuilders are such that the latter have little opportunity to chal-
lenge even the most counterproductive ideas.
How Assumptions Influence Action
Research on related concepts, such as frames (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Eden 2004; Finnemore 1996; Weick 1995), representations (Dunn 2003),
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discourse (Pouliot 2010; Neumann 2008; Wendt 1999, 83–88), habits (Hopf 2010;
Swidler 1986), knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967), and narratives (Klotz
and Lynch 2007; Krebs 2015), is crucial to understanding the process through
which assumptions influence peacebuilding efforts and outcomes. Rather than
causing or determining action, assumptions orient action by shaping people’s
understandings of the world. Assumptions make the choice of certain strategies
seem natural, appropriate, and effective, while others appear inappropriate, il-
legitimate, or even unthinkable. For instance, as I explain below, the assumption
that more education leads to individuals that are more peaceful makes it seem ap-
propriate and legitimate for peace interveners to devote resources to education
programs. In contrast, it seems unthinkable that peacebuilding actors would sup-
port corruption because the assumption is that it undermines peace. Assumptions
also shape people’s views on what counts as a problem: They affect which events
will be noticed and which will not, as well as how these events will be interpreted.
To continue with the examples of education and corruption, peacebuilders will
notice the adverse effects of corruption, but they are less likely to recognize the
counterproductive consequences of education programs. Ultimately, assumptions
authorize, enable, and justify specific actions while precluding others. These ac-
tions in turn reproduce and reinforce existing assumptions. Over time, as various
assumptions spread through the peacebuilding field and as they get reproduced
and perpetuated, interveners progressively come to take them for granted, seeing
them as natural and as the only conceivable modes of thinking and acting.
Of course, this approach and existing explanations that focus on macro-level
politics, constraints, mandates, and vested interests (see the first section of this
paper) are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they are complementary. The goal of
this article is not to challenge all of these existing explanations, but rather to add
an important—and thus far unexplored—one to the set of tools scholars and
policymakers can use to analyze peacebuilding and its effectiveness.
As the rest of this article shows, many international programs in support of
local conflict resolution rely on unsupported, untested, and potentially flawed as-
sumptions about peace, peacebuilding, and the role of outsiders and insiders.
These detrimental assumptions often lead peace efforts to be ineffective and even
counterproductive. However, when exceptional individuals and organizations
challenge these assumptions and adopt other ways of working, peacebuilding is
much more effective. My aim in this article is not to provide an exhaustive list of
such exceptional organizations and individuals, but rather to analyze a few repre-
sentative examples for each of the dominant assumptions I examine in order to
draw lessons from their experiences.
Challenging Widespread Assumptions
Good Things Do Not Necessarily Promote Peace, and Bad Things Do Not Necessarily Undermine Peace
A widespread assumption among peacebuilders is that all “good things lead to
good things” (Cameron et al. 2015, 5, also 9 and 14). For instance, education is
widely seen as “a force for good,” and many youth-oriented projects are grounded
in the belief that more education leads to more peaceful societies (Bush and
Saltarelli 2000, v; Zeus and Chaffin 2011). However, education—including pro-
grams funded by international donors as a way to help build peace—can also re-
inforce violence by promoting intolerance, stereotyping, and ethnic antagonisms
(Bush and Saltarelli 2000; King 2014; Spink 2005). Likewise, international actors
believe that youth employment programs, skills training, and microfinance help
promote peace. Yet, much empirical evidence challenges this claim (Amarasuriya,
Gu¨ndu¨z, and Mayer 2009; Blattman and Ralston 2015; Izzi 2013).
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Another widespread belief is that the “surest foundation for peace, both within
and between states, is market democracy” (Paris 1997, 56). Accordingly, numer-
ous countries, as well as institutions as diverse as the African Union, the United
Nations, the World Bank, and various non-governmental organizations, share a
“liberal peace agenda” (Paris 2004; Richmond 2005). This agenda typically em-
phasizes the organization of free and fair elections, the creation of a market econ-
omy, the separation of powers, the reform of the security sector, the rule of law,
and the advancement of human rights and civil society. Far from being a “force
for good,” however, the push toward political liberalization often fuels violence
(Autesserre 2010, chapters 3 and 5; Barnett 2006; Newman, Paris, and Richmond
2009; Paris 2004), while the promotion of market liberalization aggravates socio-
economic problems (Richmond and Franks 2009; Paris 2004; Pugh 2005;
Tadjbakhsh 2011).
Another unsupported but “widespread, overarching assumption” is that micro-
level peace will lead to macro-level peace (Ernstorfer, Chigas, and Vaughan-Lee
2015, 73). Drawing on forty-two case studies, the Reflecting on Peace Practice
Program has shown that, for most peacebuilding agencies, “local-level work, by
definition, is assumed to be relevant to peace-writ-large” (Ernstorfer et al. 2015,
72). In fact, grassroots initiatives may have a significant impact on a specific village
or district, preventing or avoiding violence and tremendously improving the lives
of the inhabitants, but carry no influence on macro-level peace (Ernstorfer et al.
2015).9
Conversely, most international interveners believe that undesirable things (like
drugs and corruption) run counter to peacebuilding objectives (author’s inter-
views, 2001–2016). As a result, numerous peacebuilding programs focus on fight-
ing undesirable phenomena like drug cultivation, corruption, and illicit busi-
nesses. In actuality, such undesirable things do not necessarily undermine peace.
In some parts of Afghanistan, drugs and corruption have in fact contributed to
political order and statebuilding (Goodhand 2008). Corruption has also contri-
buted to short-term stability in other postwar environments, such as Liberia
(Cheng and Zaum 2012; Le Billon 2003). In the Balkans, the arms trade and illicit
businesses helped “break a stalemated military situation” and “create the neces-
sary conditions for a negotiated peace” in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Andreas 2009,
38). These industries also strengthened economies throughout the region and
supplemented inadequate humanitarian aid (Andreas 2009; Hoare 2015).
In other words, contrary to the dominant assumption among peacebuilders, all
good things do not necessarily work together. Education, employment, demo-
cracy, and micro-level stability do not necessarily promote peace, while bad things
(like drug trafficking, corruption, and arms trade) do not necessarily undermine
peacebuilding efforts; in some cases, they can actually promote short-term or
long-term peace.
Peacebuilding Efforts Are Not Always Necessary
International peacebuilding initiatives, by essence, rely on the assumption that
they are needed to help build peace. As Koddenbrock’s (2016) book explains at
length, interveners present their involvement as “normal” and “self-evident.” And
indeed, of the hundreds of foreign peacebuilders I interviewed, only a handful
mentioned that local people may achieve peace on their own. All of the others
viewed the necessity of their presence as so obvious that it was not even worth
discussing.
9See Safunu (2012) for an example on Northern Ghana and Autesserre (2014a) for an analysis of the research
on this topic.
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In fact, outsiders may at times pose obstacles to the process of domestic change.
For instance, when talking with foreign interveners, Congolese youth activists em-
phasize that they would prefer outsiders to leave, because international peace-
builders get in the way of local people trying to hold their government account-
able (author’s interview, 2016).
Furthermore, peacebuilding efforts as we know them may not always be neces-
sary, as two recent studies show. In their ethnographic analysis of ten cases of war
and peace, Richards (2005, 15) and his colleagues found that “sometimes peace
breaks out even without formal peacemaking efforts.” Mac Ginty’s (2014) work on
“everyday peacebuilding” hints at a similar idea: In their day-to-day lives, ordinary
people engage in actions that researchers often view as banal, mundane, and un-
important, and that are unrelated to formal peacebuilding initiatives, but that in
fact help prevent local outbreaks of violence and, at times, even directly deal with
conflict and tensions.
The assumption that peacebuilding efforts are nevertheless needed persists be-
cause of two widespread, central—but incorrect and misleading—assumptions
about the role of outsiders and insiders. Indeed, an idea underlying “most inter-
national conflict prevention efforts,” including early warning, dispute resolution,
educational or training programs, and statebuilding, is that interveners “have to
bring something new” to conflict zones (Anderson and Wallace 2013, 2). This
idea relies on, first, the belief that people living in conflict zones lack something,
and second, the related view that international interveners can bring what local
people are missing.
Insiders Do Not Necessarily Lack Knowledge and Capacity, and Outsiders Do Not Always Have the
Capabilities That Insiders Lack
Interveners widely believe that inhabitants of conflict zones lack the knowledge,
skills, qualities, and resources they need to resolve their own predicaments.10 For
instance, a French expatriate deployed in eastern Congo explained to me that
leaders in the country are unreliable, “so only the . . . foreigners are capable of en-
acting reforms.” These negative perceptions reached such a point that, during
interviews, other interveners emphasized how “surprised” they were when they
met “good” local people, such as hardworking citizens and authorities that were
not corrupt or did not try to abuse their positions of power. I heard similar dis-
course in each of my field sites, from Afghanistan to Israel to Timor-Leste:
Interveners viewed local and national authorities as lacking in knowledge, compe-
tence, motivation, work ethics, and funding, and local people as similarly defi-
cient in education, capacity, and personal qualities (for specific examples, see
Autesserre 2014b, 197–99; Sending 2010, 26–28; Von Billerbeck 2015, 302).
The flipside of this discourse is the assumption that foreign interveners have
what local people lack and need. As Tull and Englebert (2008, 134–35) demons-
trate in their study of statebuilding in Africa, “the very nature of international
reconstruction efforts suggests that the knowledge, capacity, strategies, and re-
sources of external actors are crucial ingredients for success.” More precisely,
interveners believe that they can bring two primary contributions to conflict
zones: resources and knowledge. Surprisingly, even my military contacts focused
on these two factors and rarely mentioned security as a potential contribution.
One of the primary modes of engagement between international actors and
local organizations is through financial and logistical support (Autesserre 2014b,
205–9; Anderson and Olson 2003, 40; Pouligny 2004, 245–51). My local
10It is outside the scope of this paper to examine local reactions to the international views documented in this
section as well as the obstacles these reactions generate for peacebuilding efforts. Readers interested in these topics
can find in-depth analysis and extensive ethnographic data in Autesserre (2014b).
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interviewees often emphasized that the interveners’ resources are among their
most significant contributions, as they provide certain local peacebuilders with
the funds and logistical assets necessary to implement their programs.
However, international funding mechanisms can actually destroy local capaci-
ties and projects rather than enable them (author’s interviews; Gallo and
Vanholder 2015; Pinnington 2014). All in all, while international resources are
often crucial to support local conflict resolution efforts (Anderson, Brown, and
Jean 2012; Autesserre 2014b, 205–9), badly informed assistance can do more
harm than good (Branch 2011; Englund 2006; Gallo and Vanholder 2015;
Heathershaw 2009; Martin 2014).
Whether international interveners channel resources effectively or poorly—and
thus support local efforts instead of undermining them—largely depends on how
interveners value local knowledge and input (Autesserre 2014b). Indeed, due to
various social and historical dynamics, a knowledge hierarchy has developed in
peacebuilding (Autesserre 2014b, 68–79; Anderson et al. 2012, 27–28 and 31;
Apthorpe 2011, 200 and 202; Englebert and Tull 2008, 134–35). Today, the most
valued expertise is that of foreign interveners who are trained in peacebuilding
techniques and who have extensive experience in a variety of conflict zones. By
contrast, and although there are exceptions, country knowledge is much less va-
lued, and the knowledge of local people is usually trivialized. This knowledge
hierarchy legitimates and justifies the interveners’ claim that they have the
capacity and expertise necessary to help resolve the host populations’ problems.
The story of Michel Losembe illustrates how this assumption drives peacebuild-
ing actions. This Congolese businessman told me that he thought foreign peace-
builders were talking down to local counterparts, and that they did not take the
ideas of local people into account. Losembe is from a mixed background—he has
Belgian, Portuguese, and Congolese ancestors. During a meeting abroad, he
conducted an experiment. Instead of introducing himself as a Congolese, as he
usually did, he pretended to be from Puerto Rico. The result was clear: The indi-
viduals with whom he met perceived him as much more credible, and he had
much more influence, when he passed as an outsider.
The problem is that outsiders do not necessarily have the knowledge required
to build peace in host countries (Autesserre 2014b, part 1; Pugh 2013). In fact,
they often do not even speak the local languages, limiting their ability to interact
with the local population. Out of the 140 diplomats working at the UK embassy in
Kabul in 2010, only three “spoke an Afghan language” (Mac Ginty 2011, 112).
Out of the 1,700 United Nations police deployed in Haiti in 2005, only one hun-
dred spoke French or Creole (Meharg 2009, 136). Conditions were similar in
Cyprus and Sudan, where I met only a handful of non-governmental, diplomatic,
military, or United Nations personnel who had a command of Greek or Turkish,
or Arabic or Nuer.
Conversely, as Anderson and Wallace emphasize, “systems and skills to prevent
overt violence between groups already exist in every society” (2013, 2). And in-
deed, in each of my field sites, I met expatriates who pointed to local and national
authorities who had the knowledge, competence, motivation, work ethics, and
skills essential to peacebuilding, and to local people who were intelligent, know-
ledgeable, selfless, reliable, honest, and hardworking.
These exceptional interveners challenged the assumptions developed in this
section, and they emphasized that, to be effective, peace efforts must draw on the
knowledge of both insiders and outsiders.11 Local and foreign peacebuilders with
various competencies each contribute different “perspectives, networks, assets,
11For a similar claim, see Anderson and Olson (2003, chapter 5); Anderson et al. (2012); Autesserre (2014b,
64–67 and 71–73); Campbell (2010, 11, 14, 16, 25, 52–59, and 69); CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2010, 2–
5); Mac Ginty (2008, 141–43); McGuinness (2012); O Suilleabhain (2015).
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and leverage with particular constituencies,” all of which are essential to peace-
building (Anderson and Olson 2003, 35). As Anderson and Olson (2003, 42)
have demonstrated, these various types of peacebuilders make the greatest contri-
butions to peace when they work together, each challenging the biases of the
other. The communities that “opted out of war” in Colombia, the Philippines,
and Sri Lanka are prime examples of this kind of successful cooperation
(Anderson and Wallace 2013, 85–86 and 129–42). While the idea of “peace
communities” or “peace zones” came from outsiders, foreign interveners let local
people decide on the specific approaches to implementation. One of the most de-
cisive strategies the insiders adopted was to work with foreign interveners in order
to use “the power of international public opinion” to pressure surrounding armed
groups into not attacking their communities.
Conclusion
Violence disrupts the lives of close to one and a half billion people (International
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2016); it damages the fabric of their
societies and shapes the political institutions that govern them. Most of these peo-
ple yearn for the day peace will eventually prevail. International interventions can
help achieve this goal, but they often fail to make their intended impact, and they
sometimes worsen the situation. It is therefore crucial to increase the effectiveness
of international peace efforts.
Since I started working on war and peace issues seventeen years ago, I have
heard a constant refrain: Policymakers and practitioners deplore that many of
their standard peacebuilding templates and techniques are ineffective, but that
they nevertheless have to continue using these models because no one has yet
offered a convincing alternative. Recipients of intervention lament that, although
international support could help decrease ongoing tensions, it rarely reaches its
full potential. As a result, peacebuilders often request research on initiatives that
have succeeded in promoting peace in other parts of the world and that could
serve as models for their own efforts.
Further investigation of successful local peacebuilding initiatives, the contribu-
tions of foreign actors to such processes, and the elements that shape effective
international action at the grassroots level is necessary to build the credible alter-
natives that are so sorely needed. This article—the first of a broader project—
nevertheless provides a jumping-off point. In order to help change the basic
premises on which many programs rely, I have emphasized the role of assump-
tions in influencing the effectiveness of international peacebuilding.
Many international programs in support of local conflict resolution rely on un-
supported and flawed assumptions, such as: Good things always go together;
peacebuilding efforts are always necessary; and insiders lack the capacity and
knowledge to resolve their own predicaments. As a result, these international
peace efforts end up being ineffective and even counterproductive. By contrast,
programs that rely on different assumptions—such as: Undesirable practices may
help promote peace, peacebuilding efforts are not always necessary, and insiders
have much of the required knowledge and capacity—are much more effective at
supporting local actors to build long-term, sustainable peace.
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